Affective and Cognitive Empathy’s Congruence with the Buddhist No-Self Doctrine
The following paper was my final examination for Buddhist Philosophy during my Senior year.
It intuitively seems like the no-self doctrine in Buddhist ethics would exist at odds with empathy given that empathy seems to imply a level of personal-resonation and possession of a unified personal consciousness. In this post, I will look at the relationship between the Buddhist no-self doctrine and empathy, arguing that affective empathy and cognitive empathy do not exist at odds with the no-self doctrine and, when practiced through other-perspective taking, actually work towards the dissolution of self versus other and the cultivation of bodhicitta. First, I will introduce suffering’s relationship to the no-self doctrine and alternative phenomenological views of ‘self’. Then, I will describe the broad relationship between empathy and compassion and distinguish between two types of empathy. Finally, I will explain exchanging self and other as a practice of empathetic self-projection and argue that affective empathy, at the very least, does not pose problems for the no-self doctrine while cultivating cognitive empathy by taking on another’s perspective actually solidifies the no-self doctrine.
Introducing The No-Self Doctrine
In this section, I will contextualize the notion of self as a prong of suffering rooted in craving, elucidate the no-self doctrine according to Amber Carpenter’s account, and describe the impermanent aggregates of self.
The belief that one has a self is a form of craving that, on the Buddhist account, breeds suffering. The first Noble Truth identifies suffering (Dukkha) as both all-pervasive and unavoidable. Given Buddhism’s emphasis on causality, the second Noble Truth seeks to identify suffering’s origins. Suffering has a myriad of origins, but most center around one’s primordial desire to cling, crave, or thirst for temporal things (tanhā). Tanhā can be divided into three primary kleshas, or afflictions, in the form of delusion (moha), attachment (raga), and aversion (dvesa). Engagement with each of these kleshas ensnares one in the ceaseless cycle of repeated birth into mundane existence (samsāra), which is the antithesis of what a well-instructed Buddhist ought to strive for.
Delusion can take several forms, but the idea that one has a permanent, invulnerable core self (ātman) sits at the forefront of suffering rooted in delusion. It seems that a “sense of self is a phenomenological fact which cannot be denied,” but Buddhists argue that this phenomenological self is merely a changing collection or heap of instances composed of attributes that are neither singular nor unified (Carpenter 213). If one believes the real existence of something that “[answers] to that sense,” they begin to problematically distinguish between self and other (214). In other words, one experiences suffering when they begin to draw boundaries between “I and mine,” which constitutes an egocentric perspective where one sees the entire world in relation to oneself. To exemplify how this boundary-establishing egocentricity relates to one’s perception, one might consider how it permeates both affective and material identification. When one conceptualizes a self, they begin to attribute certain feelings and things to the self and deny attribution of other feelings and things. That is, one “determine[s] a subset of reality as mine” wherein “this bit belongs to me, the rest not; this bit is my special concern, the rest not” (213). The sense of self that Buddhism rejects is the one that, once believed in and attached to, encourages one to egotistically frame thinking in terms of self and what the self possesses and, conversely, what the self does not possess or concern itself with. Everything begins to be understood in terms of how it relates to oneself.
The delusion that one has an impermanent self also assumes a secondary delusion of ignorance to the impermanent nature of the world (anitya). According to Buddhists, nothing is permanent and no singular element (including the self) remains unchanged through time and reincarnation. Everything is in flux, constantly arising and dissipating. However, the phenomenological notion of self can be properly described in terms of five ununified and non-singular aggregates. The Five Aggregates of physical form, affective tone, recognition, conditioning, and awareness stand not as static things comprising the self, but rather as heaps or collections of dynamic processes. There is no inner self, which might pose challenges for those who believe in a unified soul or hold that a core self is necessary for retributive practices. Essentially, the notion that one has a self that can be separated from others is a delusion that also assumes ignorance to the impermanent nature of the world; delusion of the self and delusion regarding the way the world really is constitute craving, which is the origin of all-pervasive suffering.
Describing Two Forms of Empathy
I will now provide a broad definition of empathy according to Emily McRae’s account and distinguish between two proposed types of empathy.
Empathy can be loosely defined as “the experience of vicarious feeling” or “feeling with another” (McRae 123). Empathy can be more narrowly defined by distinguishing it from a related (yet distinct) term–compassion, or karuña. While compassion involves the process of taking on another’s feeling as the object of our own feeling, empathy is a moral skill that can be both learned and trained (123). In other words, empathy is a moral skill where one “feels with another” whereas compassion is “an emotional and conative response” to the perception that another person is suffering (125). For example, one might practice their empathetic capacity and thus know how their friends are feeling in given moments. However, this sensitivity and simulated suffering of others does not constitute compassion unless the individual desires to alleviate their friends’ suffering and subsequently acts “in accordance with that desire when possible” (125). Empathy plays a significant role in compassion practices because it involves moral perception and moral reasoning that, when combined with “certain habits of desire and action” motivates a compassionate response to other people’s suffering (125).
While Emily McRae speaks rather broadly about empathy, the term can be divided into two distinct types. The first, cognitive empathy, describes the process of understanding the mental state of another person. That is, cognitive empathy enables one to recognize another person’s suffering. Given that empathy is a practicable skill, one might ask the following questions to cultivate cognitive empathy: What is X individual’s view of the world? What is X individual’s perspective on a given issue? Or, what might it be like to be in X individual’s head? In terms of suffering, the employment of cognitive empathy helps one recognize that another person is in a mental state characterized by suffering. Affective empathy, on the other hand, aligns more so with the identification of or resonation with another’s suffering. Affective empathy is typically a quick, neurological, felt-force simulation upon the perception that another person is suffering. Although affective empathy is arguably more difficult to cultivate given its potential neurological basis in mirror neurons, one might be able to begin cultivation by asking questions like the following: How is X individual feeling in this given moment? Have I been through something similar to individual X? Such questions, when applied to the perception of suffering, will hone one’s ability to resonate or feel with the suffering of another. To some degree, engaging affective empathy in response to perceived suffering entails personally feeling a degree of their suffering, perhaps due to some degree of situational familiarity.
Explaining Empathetic Cultivation and Coherence with the No-Self Doctrine
I will conclude by describing the significance of empathetic imaginative projection and exchanging self and other to the cultivation of bodhicitta and arguing for affective and cognitive empathy’s coherence with the no-self doctrine.
Empathetic imaginative projection is a concept that, when employed through the transformative practice of exchanging self and other, can dismantle one’s self-clinging. Imaginative projection is the process of using one’s imagination to project oneself onto another person’s experience (124). For example, one might think of what they themselves would do in a given situation or take the suffering of a friend upon themself. Practicing empathetic imaginative projection through exchanging self and other is a moral means of developing empathy which, in turn, cultivates compassion. To exchange self and other, one first imagines themself from the perspective of someone they deem inferior. Then, they take on this person’s point of view “to the point where one actually feels envy towards oneself (who has now been othered)” (126). Eventually, one moves on to take on the perspective of someone more familiar, such as their own mother. And, ultimately, one broadens their practice to concertedly exchange perspectives with individuals in a wider moral community. The delusion that one has a self creates a perspective where one sees others as essentially different from themselves and where one is the center of their moral universe. Yet, when one takes on the perspective of another, they instead place this person at the center of their moral universe, dissolving the boundary between themselves and others. Instead of attaching to the self as a possession and viewing the world in terms of“I” and “Mine,” one begins to see the world and the people in it as essentially amorphous, or perhaps even in a metaphysically ununified flux. Exchanging self and other as a practice of imaginative projection strengthens empathy, which brings about care. Empathy and care, along with overcoming the delusion, forms the foundation for bodhicitta. Bodhicitta serves as the primary moral ideal of Mahayana Buddhism and describes a “radically altruistic moral orientation” where one has cultivated themselves to the point of becoming a person “who can reliably, effectively, and wisely benefit others” (128).
It initially seems like empathy would exist at odds with the no-self doctrine given that resonating with another individual appears to imply that one possesses a personal consciousness, but based on the aforementioned means of cultivating empathy, both cognitive and affective empathy actually seem to help solidify one’s lack of unified self. It is important to note here the distinction between applying one’s perspective to another’s experience and taking on another’s perspective. The former kind of self-oriented perspective-taking does seem to exist at odds with the no-self doctrine given the fact that, to have a perspective, there has to be a self who possesses the given perspective. The latter is a form of other-oriented perspective-taking which, I argue, is the form that most relevantly helps one dissolve the self versus other perspective. I will also concede that affective empathy does not necessarily seem as practicable as cognitive empathy given that affective empathetic responses arise immediately and might be partially influenced by one’s mirror neurons. Yet, perhaps if one practices the exchange of self and other to the point of complete dissolution of the self versus other boundary, then one might be able to alter the neural pathways that culminate in this immediate reaction. Either way, affective empathy is not a problem for the no-self doctrine because it is partially a mistake. When one “feels” the pain of another, they are not feeling their own pain. It is not one individual’s pain versus another individual’s pain, but rather their pain that your bundle of aggregate parts perceives and recognizes. It is, in a sense, shared by rather than possessed by any singular self.
Cognitive empathy similarly does not exist at odds with the no-self doctrine and, when practiced, can actually aid in the dissolution of the self versus other boundary. While consistently viewing oneself from the perspective of others might cause one to “grow tired of” or “be repulsed by…self clinging,” and thus move one away from adhering to the delusion of an impermanent self, taking on the perspective of another cultivates compassion and motivates altruism (126). For example, a baseline cognitive empathetic possession might allow one to recognize another’s mental state but, if one eventually gets to the stage where they can practice exchanging self and other with total strangers, other peoples’ mental states ought to completely dissolve into one’s own. One shifts from an egocentric being to a being so integrated with others’ mental states that there is virtually no difference between the aggregates of one and the aggregates of another. If one cultivates this cognitive empathetic state, they are more likely to understand another’s mental state, which consequently motivates altruistic and compassionate behavior.
In summation, the no-self doctrine and empathy might initially seem incongruous on the basis that empathy implies a self who empathizes. Yet, Buddhists hold that the self is merely an ever-changing bundle of aggregates and that empathy is a practice that encourages one to cease conceiving of phenomenological distinctions between the ‘self and other’. Thus, one is misguided when they conceive of the immediate, felt-force, affective empathetic response to another's suffering as their own suffering; cognitive empathy, especially when practiced by taking on another person’s perspective, helps one dissolve the self versus other distinction and cultivate compassion.
References
Carpenter, Amber. “The Sāmmitīyas and the Case of the Missing Who: A Buddhist Whodunit?” The Return of Consciousness – A New Science on Ancient Questions, 2017.
McRae, Emily. “Empathy, Compassion, and ‘Exchanging Self and Other’ in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism.” The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy, 2017, pp. 123–133., https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315282015-12.
